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Introduction
Intergenerational mobility is a topic studied by both sociologists and economists, with the latter focusing on income or earnings mobility (see reviews by Björklund and Jäntti 2009; Black and Devereux 2011) and the former on occupational or class mobility (reviewed by Breen and Jonsson 2005) . When societies are ranked according to the extent of their economic and social intergenerational mobility we see a good deal of agreement, with the Scandinavian countries displaying high rates of income mobility and high relative social mobility -or social fluidity 1 -and countries such as Britain, Italy and Germany somewhat lower levels of both (see Breen 2004 for data on social mobility; Corak 2004 and Björklund and Jäntti 2009 for income mobility; and Blanden 2013 for international comparisons of both). However, there is no necessary relationship between the two forms of mobility. For example, US social fluidity is usually found to be relatively high and similar to that of Sweden and the Netherlands (Beller and Hout 2006, Ferrie 2005 ; cf. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1985) yet it has one of the highest intergenerational income elasticities (and thus the lowest mobility) among the OECD countries (Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992; Mazumder 2005 ). China may be a similar contradictory case, having a very high intergenerational elasticity of income (Gong, Leigh and Meng 2010) yet high social fluidity (Ishida and Miwa 2012) .
Conceptually, one strand in the literature holds that income and social mobility simply capture different phenomena. Björklund and Jäntti (2010: 212) , for example, state that "from a purely conceptual point of view, … class and income … are obviously different aspects of a person's position in society.
Hence, we ought to treat these … branches of mobility analysis as complementary". The same position is taken by Erikson and Goldthorpe (2010: 212) : "intergenerational income mobility and intergenerational class mobility are of course different phenomena, and there is no a priori reason why they should change in tandem." However, it is not difficult to find a different view of the relationship between income and social mobility, according to which they are both indicators of a fundamental underlying inequality dynamic -such as the intergenerational reproduction of advantage and disadvantage -which is often taken to reflect inequality of opportunity or societal openness (e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) . In this view, the ideal objects of analysis -class position, in the case of sociologists, and lifetime income for economists -both claim to capture variations in life chances; that is, 'the chances an individual has of sharing in the socially created economic or cultural "goods" which typically exist in any given society' 3 (Giddens 1973: 130-1) . As Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan (2013: 542) state, in their comparison of social and economic mobility trends in the UK: "the view that we adopt here is that both are trying to assess long-term or permanent socio-economic status but measure it in different ways". Here discrepancies, such as that found in the US case, have to be explained in terms of differences in the empirical operationalization of the two forms of mobility.
Whether we accept the idea that the two ways of studying intergenerational associations embody something common, or take the view that they are different, the fundamental question is the same: how are income and social mobility related, both formally and empirically? Are they so closely related that divergent trends over time, or differences in country rankings, should be seen as paradoxes, or are they so disconnected that viewing them as two indicators of a common phenomenon is likely to be entirely off the mark? No study has so far analyzed the empirical relationship between income and social mobility, and our first contribution is to shed light on this issue using uniquely suitable population data from Sweden that allow us to model the two processes simultaneously and estimate the intergenerational associations with great precision. In doing so, we follow both common practice and economic theories to design income mobility models. For social mobility, we use the internationally well-known EGP social class schema (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) as well as the more detailed occupational, or "micro-class", schema to model social class mobility (Grusky and Sorensen 1998) . Starting from a framework developed by Björklund and Jäntti (2000) , Blanden (2013) , and Blanden et al. (2013) we ask how much of the income correlations across generations could be accounted for by social mobility, and we estimate the degree of overlap between income and social class mobility to be 30-50 percent. 2 We show this overlap not only for the conventionally reported father-to-son association, but take a step forward by also studying the impact of mothers and the outcomes of daughters.
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Intergenerational mobility
Social mobility
The study of intergenerational social class mobility has been a mainstay of sociological research at least since the 1950s (Carlsson 1958; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Breen 2004) . Since the 1980s, mobility tables have normally been analyzed using loglinear models, for which 2 We could also have asked how much of social mobility can be accounted for by income mobility. Empirically this leads to a more cumbersome analysis but the mathematical relationship is shown in Appendix B. 3 We should stress that we are not seeking to make a causal claim about the extent to which social mobility causes economic mobility (or vice versa), nor are we trying to model the pathways through which origin status, whether in terms of class or income, is transformed into destination status. There is a large and growing literature dealing with the latter topic that often brings together sociologists and economists (see, for example, Ermisch, Jäntti and Smeeding 2012; Smeeding, Erikson and Jäntti 2011 (Hout 1983; Sobel, Hout, and Duncan 1985) . A distinction is made between absolute mobility, which is the pattern of flows from origins to destinations that can be observed in the mobility table, and relative mobility or social fluidity, captured by odds ratios. These are the ratio of the odds, among respondents born into one class origin, compared with those born into another, of coming to occupy one social class destination rather than another. Odds ratios are said to be 'margin invariant' because they are unchanged under the multiplication of any row or column of the mobility table by a scalar, permitting comparisons among tables which may have different marginal distributions.
A log-linear model for the mobility table can be written: There is general agreement on the ranking of countries in terms of their social fluidity. Sweden, the Netherlands, and Israel belong to the group of more socially fluid countries, while Germany, Italy, and Ireland are characterized by a low level of fluidity (Breen and Luijkx 2004) . Though comparisons are not straightforward (mainly because of the difficulties of deriving, from US occupational codes, a class classification comparable to the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema used in most comparative research), it seems that the US is characterized by quite high social fluidity (Breen and Jonsson 2005) , not far off the Swedish figure (Jonsson et al. 2009 ).
Income mobility
The study of intergenerational income mobility is a rapidly growing research area within economics (e.g., Atkinson 1983; Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992; Corak 2004) . It focuses on the parent-child (usually father-son) correlation or elasticity of income or earnings. Normally, researchers relate the child's income as an adult to his or her parent's income using a regression model:
Here i denotes a family (a parent -child pair), y ip is parental income and y ic is child's income. The average log income among children is captured in a , while b, the regression coefficient, estimates the empirically and explain formally how two types of mobility are related.
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intergenerational elasticity of incomes. The error term, e , is assumed independent of parental income.
b can be interpreted as the fraction of the income differences among parents that are transmitted to children.
An intergenerational elasticity of around 0.3 means that almost a third of the income differences of two randomly chosen parents in a population will, on average, be found among their children. This representation of intergenerational mobility is a summary measure and as such suffers from the typical weaknesses of summary measures, but it can be made more complex by including non-linearities (e.g., Bratsberg et al. 2007 ). However, precisely because the elasticity is a summary indicator it is very useful for assessing differences between countries. In general terms it seems income mobility is higher in the Nordic countries and in Canada than in the USA, the UK, Germany, France, and Italy -though several of the estimates reported in the international literature are surrounded by large standard errors.
A minimum requirement for this kind of analysis is data on a parent and his or her child's income, and such data are difficult to obtain, and, even when available, usually relate to different age-ranges of the parents and children. Because incomes typically increase with age, in particular for those in higher social positions, it is usual to add age and the square of age to the specification of equation (2). Furthermore, economists ideally seek to measure 'permanent' or 'lifetime' income, and for this many years' income data are necessary in order to average out transitory income components. Early estimates of income mobility in the USA reported an elasticity lower than 0.20, but later studies, using more years of parental income, yielded estimates around 0.40 (Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992) . Mazumder (2005) , using very long run measures of parental earnings, claimed that the US elasticity could be as high as 0.6.
Sociologists who study social mobility are most often interested in the underlying association between parents' and children's class in the mobility table, controlling for the different marginal distributions of origins and destinations (i.e. structural differences between parents' and children's class distributions). But it is uncommon to find a similar approach among economists. The elasticity depends on both the correlation between parents' and children's (log) incomes and the ratio of the standard deviations of each. If we believe that the former captures the underlying parent -child income association, we can transform the elasticity into a correlation by multiplying it by the ratio of the standard deviation of the log of parent's income, s p to the standard deviation of child's log income, s c :
so giving a margin-invariant measure paralleling the sociologists' use of odds ratios. Because it is not yet common practice to report intergenerational income correlations, we are uncertain about differences between countries or trends over time in the intergenerational correlation. For Sweden, however, Jonsson, Mood and Bihagen (2010) showed that the intergenerational household income correlation decreased for 6 33-37 year-olds during the period 1993-2007, while the elasticities increased, so demonstrating the advisability of considering both types of income associations.
The mathematical relationship between income mobility and social mobility
A reviewer of the literatures in social and income mobility could not fail to be struck by the very limited degree to which they engage each other. Some commentators have certainly drawn attention to parallel findings in the two literatures (Sweden and Scandinavia most fluid) and to some striking discrepancies of which the US provides a good example. Björklund and Jäntti (2000) sought to reconcile economic and social mobility by expressing the relationship between them in a simple model of how much of the intergenerational income correlation is mediated via intergenerational social mobility. Here we follow their exposition.
Write income in each generation as a function of social class and a residual term:
for one or both parents (most often the father), and Björklund and Jäntti (2000) argued that the covariance between y ip and y ic could be expressed as the sum of two paths. The first path, proceeding via social class, is given by the product of the effects of class on income in each generation and the joint distribution of parent's and child's class: that is
c . This captures that part of the intergenerational covariance in income due to intergenerational class mobility. The second path is equal to cov(e p e c ) and captures the impact of the transmission of other factors than class. Björklund and Jäntti's insight, however, was to see that (4a) and (4b).
The elements added by Blanden et al (2013) are shown by the diagonal lines linking parent and child, and they allow for the possibility that factors independent of parent's class but related to parent's income are correlated with child's class position, and that parent's class is correlated with other child factors, independent of child's class, that influence child's income. We could think of a number of characteristics that we do not observe in normal mobility studies that exemplify these diagonal links. The variation within classes in educational qualifications, skills and abilities are obvious examples and, when such characteristics are measured (mostly at the child level, where data are more readily available), they account for some -but not all -of the intergenerational income correlation (Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan 2007; Mood et al. 2012) . In many traditional studies using only information on fathers, the error term on the parental side will of course include those characteristics of mothers that are unrelated to father's class but related to his income.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
One of the clearest examples of a factor that is captured in e, and thus influences the variation in income within a social class, is occupation. Although classes are, for the most part, aggregates of occupations, we do not expect all occupations within a class to have the same average income, and, if there is a relationship between parent and child occupations beyond that captured by class, this will appear as part of the covariance of residual terms, cov(e p e c ).
Following the graphical representation in Figure 1 , the covariance between parents' and child's income decomposes fully into these four paths; 
where s c is the standard deviation of child's income.
If we were using logged income, (6a) would be the intergenerational income elasticity. As noted earlier, to compare social mobility with income mobility we focus not on the regression of child's income on parent's income but on their correlation. The part of the intergenerational income correlation due to social mobility is
The case of Sweden
The Swedish case is a valuable one to consider. Studies of social mobility have found that in Sweden class origins are more weakly related to class destinations than in most other countries (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Breen 2004) and there has been a fairly lengthy period during which the impact of origins on destinations has steadily weakened (Erikson 1983; Breen and Jonsson 2007 
Data and variables
We estimate economic and social mobility, and the individual components of equation (5) used to construct classes in two different degrees of aggregation. The first is a "big-class" scheme, closely related to the Erikson-Goldthorpe (EGP) class schema. Because we omit the self-employed and farmers 10 from our analyses, the usual seven EGP classes are reduced to five, and these are described in Table 1 (the Roman numerals refer to the EGP classes 8 ).
The second class schema is built on occupations, or "micro-classes", defined as occupational categories that share common features in the technical-functional division of labour, including skill requirements, training, and working conditions (Grusky 2005) . We define 77 micro-classes, based on the coding algorithm presented in Jonsson et al. (2009, App. Table A2) , and described at www.classmobility.org. 9 We expect the occupational groupings to pick up income variation within big classes, so shedding light on what the maximum overlap between social and economic mobility might be.
Knowing the difference between the two class schemata in this respect is useful, given that, in most normal (survey) data sets, it will not be possible to use more than 5-10 classes. For both class schemata, we use the individual's own class and also the family dominant class, where dominant class is the class of the person whose occupation has the highest status, using the SIOPS occupational scale for ranking (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996) . Comparing fathers and sons, we see the well-known upgrading of the class structure (here, between 1970 and 1990), with the upper middle class (I) expansion from 9 to 21 percent and the corresponding decline of the working classes (VI and VII) from 59 to 44 percent. Comparing sons and daughters also brings out much of the gender inequality in modern labor markets, with women being concentrated in lower-grade manual (VII) and non-manual (III) jobs, while being much less represented in professional and managerial positions (I). But we also note the rapid upgrading of women's class positions when comparing daughters with their mothers. Mothers' labor market attachment in 1970 was still weak (43% had no recorded occupation) and dominated by unskilled manual work, and this large discrepancy between mothers and daughters explains why we do not conduct mobility analysis between them. The distribution of dominant ("household") class origin is similar to that of father's class, but, because we include the whole population here (some of whom grew up without a father), there are some small dissimilarities. The minor differences between sons' and daughters' household class distributions are due to the class destinations of single 8 The classification used is a Swedish standard socioeconomic classification (SEI), with the conversion (I=SEI 56, 57, 60; II=SEI 46; III=SEI 33, 36; VI=SEI 21, 22; VII=SEI 11, 12) . 9 We deviate from this coding protocol by merging housekeeping workers with janitors and cleaners; cashiers with shop assistants; (employed) fishermen with farm laborers; nursery school teachers and aids with primary school teachers. Because we do not use self-employed in this study, the micro-class of proprietors is not included. Instead, we identify military personnel as a separate micro-class.
Descriptives
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people.
[ Finally, panel D shows the descriptive statistics for age. Children's incomes are measured when they are around 40, but parents are about 10 years older, on average, when their incomes are measured, and they display much greater variation in age.
Results
There are several ways of conceiving of and defining the intergenerational income correlation. We use three specifications, derived from previous studies and existing theory. Our first specification focuses on the relationship between father's and child's own income from work and on father's and child's individual class. This is common practice in both the income and social mobility literature, where mother's and spouse's class or income are commonly ignored; we call this the standard model. Our second specification, which we call the origin family model, replaces father's work income and father's own class with a measure of disposable family income and a measure of class origins based on the dominant class position of father or mother, but it retains the individual work income and class for children. This model seeks to capture origins more fully by including the income and class position of both parents. It comes closest to the Becker and Tomes (1986) child investment model, which posits that it is the actual total economic resources in the household that influence children's educational and income opportunities.
Our third and last specification -the gross model -takes the origin family model and replaces the individual income and class measures of the child with his or her disposable family income and a dominance measure of class (based on whichever of the child or child's spouse's class is considered dominant). We call this the gross model because it measures family, rather than individual, resources in 12 both generations. As a consequence this model captures not only the direct transmission of income from origin to destination family but also the effects of assortative mating in the child generation.
Applying these three specifications to samples of male and female respondents generates 6 income correlations, shown in Figure 2 . The correlations are larger for men than for women. This finding, common in the literature on economic mobility (see Lee and Solon 2009 ) is, to some extent, a consequence of the gender gap in earnings that introduces a source of father-daughter economic mobility that has no counterpart in the father-son comparison.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
For both sexes the correlations are greatest in the standard model (model 1) and weakest in the gross model (model 3). The latter result is expected, given that the gross model includes the impact of spouse's income, which, despite the tendency towards assortative mating, dilutes the intergenerational correlation.
Nonetheless, this is the true association between disposable incomes in the family of origin and the family of destination. That the income of the father alone is a better predictor of sons' incomes than the income of father and mother together, and the finding that this is not so for women, is probably a further manifestation of the gender gap in earnings. Adding the mother's income to father's income adds noise to the father -son correlation, but not to the father -daughter correlation.
Next, we decompose the income correlations from Figure 2 into the four parts shown in equation (5), using both of our two measures of social class -the EGP 5 class schema and the 77 micro-classes. The coefficients are generated from models that include age and age squared, but this makes almost no difference to the results (coefficients with and without age controls differ only at the third decimal place). The use of the 77 micro-class mobility table increases the degree to which class mobility and income mobility are directly related: in the standard model applied to men, micro-class mobility accounts for almost 46 per cent of the intergenerational correlation (compared with 39 per cent for EGP class mobility). As expected, the use of a finer class classification reduces within-class variation and so the impact of the correlation between the errors is lessened. This is also true of the other model specifications for men: micro-class mobility accounts for more of the income correlation even though the impact of class mobility diminishes as we move from the standard model to the origin family model and then the gross model. Overall, however, the improvement brought about by moving from five to 77 classes is quite modest. The reason for this is that micro-classes largely capture a lateral dimension in the class structure, which is rather weakly related to income in Sweden. Although the differences in social networks, skills, and occupational aspirations between, say, bakers, metal workers, and carpenters may be essential for social class inheritance, they do not necessarily imply any income differences. This, in turn, reflects the different processes supposed to generate social and economic mobility, respectively, but here it is best to caution against generalizing beyond the case of Sweden.
The results for women (daughters) are both similar and different from those of men. For our main question, the most striking difference is that class mobility accounts for more of the income correlationalmost half in the standard model, falling to 38 per cent in the gross model (Figure 3) , and the residual correlation accounts for less of the overlap among women than among men (Appendix A). This difference may come about because men's disproportionate frequency among high-income earners leads to larger within-class variation, and the characteristics that account for this can be expected to be correlated across generations. The micro-class model picks up parts of this residual for men, suggesting that some of the unobserved characteristics are related to occupations (such as occupation-specific skills, qualifications, or aspirations). For women, on the other hand, the micro-classes perform particularly poorly: indeed, in the origin family model and the gross model, micro-class mobility accounts for less of the intergenerational income correlation than does EGP class mobility. This is most likely because the relationship between parental class (which is predominantly the father's rather than mother's class in the dominance approach) and daughter's class is stronger at the EGP big-class level than at the level of micro-classes because of occupational gender segregation (Jonsson et al. 2009 ).
When we move from the conventional model (involving fathers only) to the family origin model, and 14 also to the gross model, we bring in mothers' income and class. If it were the case that there were a gender interaction in the mobility process, we would have expected that the decline in the share of the income correlation accounted for by social mobility across models would not have been as sharp for women.
Instead, we find a similar decline for women as for men when we move from the standard to the gross model, and the residual part of the intergenerational correlation increases even more for daughters. This result suggests that there is no obvious mother-daughter interaction in the mobility process.
How are economic and social mobility related?
For fixed inequality of parents' incomes and also of children's incomes, social mobility, M, will account for more of the income mobility correlation when class is more strongly predictive of income and/or when parents' class is more strongly predictive of child's class. When class is more predictive of income, the ratio of the between-class to within-class variance in income among both parents and children will be large, average income differences between classes, captured in the vectors b p and b c , will also be large, and the three terms in equation (4) cov(e c X p ) -will be small, and so income mobility will be closely linked to social mobility.
Parental class will be more strongly predictive of child's class when the origin and destination distributions are more similar, all else equal, because this will lead to a higher covariance between origins and destinations. This, in turn, will be associated with a higher income correlation through social mobility.
If Swedish sons had the same marginal class distribution as their fathers, the intergenerational income correlation implied by social mobility would increase from its observed 0.126 to 0.186. On the other hand,
given fixed origin and destination distributions, greater social mobility means that parent's class is a poorer predictor of child's class, leading to a weaker covariance between parental and child class and a lower implied intergenerational income correlation. Thus, all else equal, at times of rapid structural change, where the class distribution of the respondents in a mobility survey differs greatly from that of their parents, we should expect to see a weaker relationship between social and economic mobility.
Increasing social mobiity will cause the origin-destination covariance to decline and so will be directly linked to increasing intergenerational economic mobility. Nevertheless two countries with identical social mobility could differ in their intergenerational income correlation if class predicted income more closely in one country than the other and/or if the marginal distributions of parents and children were more similar in one than the other. Conversely, countries with different social mobility would not differ so much in their income mobility if they were more similar in these two respects.
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Conclusions
Recent research of the transmission of advantage and disadvantage across generations has seen a burgeoning literature on income mobility as an alternative, or a complement, to the study of social class mobility. These studies have however reported paradoxical results -the USA, for example, has been portrayed as a relatively equal country in terms of social mobility, but as highly unequal in terms of income mobility. How, then, are social and income mobility related? Our contribution to answering this challenging question is to measure their relationship empirically, using data from Swedish population registers and censuses that are uniquely suitable for this endeavor; and to understand the relationship mathematically.
We find, for the standard father-to-son model, that the intergenerational income correlation implied by the pattern of intergenerational class mobility is 0.12 when using a five-class schema and 0.14 when we used a 77 'micro-class' classification. These represent 39 and 46 percent, respectively, of the observed income correlation of 0.3. We extended this model in several ways: by including daughters; by bringing in mothers' incomes to form a total household income that is integral to the child investment model; and by using total household income both for parents and children, so that the intergenerational income correlation included the effect of origin on partner selection. The intergenerational correlations for daughters are lower than for sons, irrespective of the definition of parental income, but the part accounted for by social mobility is generally higher. For sons, the residual income correlation (not involving class in either generation) is high, suggesting that characteristics of fathers that vary within classes have a strong effect on sons' incomes. And while these characteristics may include those we normally do not observe (such as skills, abilities, aspirations, and networks), we find that replacing the EGP five-class schema with 77 micro-classes accounts for some of this residual, suggesting that these characteristics are related to occupations. However, for women, the five-class schema accounts for more of the intergenerational income correlation than the 77 micro-class schema. This, we believe, is predominantly an effect of occupational gender segregation, which leads to a mismatch of fathers' and daughters' occupations, meaning that the micro-class mobility table is more erratic for the father-daughter combination, and so accounts for less of the income correlation than the five-class mobility table.
There are good grounds for supposing that the percentage accruing to the five-class schema is high because of Sweden's centralized wage bargaining and a relatively regulated labor market, with the concomitant low variations in wage within social classes. This is unlikely to be the case in the 'liberal regime' countries like the UK and US where the difference in results between a more and less aggregated class schema might be expected to be greater. Indeed, it may be that countries such as the US and China appear to be outliers in the social-income mobility relationship because most of the data we have on both types of intergenerational mobility comes from European societies, in many of which labor market 16 regulations and centralized wage bargaining may lead to a closer relationship between class and income than exists in other parts of the world.
This brings us back, finally, to the question of whether social and income mobility should be seen as two ways of measuring some underlying concept of inequality, or whether they capture distinct social processes. We have not addressed the conceptual issue here, but rather attempted to contribute by analyzing the overlap empirically and mathematically. Our overall conclusion is that social and income mobility are positively related, but that the degree of overlap is moderate. Normally, we would expect the two types of mobility to move in the same direction, but this is by no means a necessity. The relationship between them is dependent not only on the association in the mobility table, but also on other circumstances. It also depends on how we measure class and income, and whether we study men or women -the overlap between social and income mobility ranges from 32 to 49 percent in our analyses of Swedish data, and this range may be greater with other mobility models and with data from other countries. Our results have shown that it is quite possible for a country to experience an increase in one type of mobility and a decrease in the other; and that a country may score high internationally on one but not the other. There is no paradox in such situations; and, indeed, the approach taken in this paper sets out the means by which the relationship between social and income mobility in any specific case may be made more intelligible. 
